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Abstract: This study investigates the impact of excessive entrepreneurial activity on 
natural resource rents. We employ the ecological perspective to argue that while 




entrepreneurship is usually associated with innovation and improved efficiency, and thus 
reduced natural resource rents, excessive entrepreneurial activity may increase natural 
resource rents and harm the environment. Investigating a global sample of 70 countries 
over 11 years (2006–2016) using advanced techniques to address econometric issues, we 
find initial evidence supporting the natural resource rents of excessive entrepreneurship. 
We also find heterogeneity between high-income economies (HIEs) and low and middle-
income economies (LMEs) as well as between four vital natural resources: coal, gas, forest, 
and minerals. The findings in this study contribute to the growing literature examining 
sustainable entrepreneurial ecosystems. 
Keywords: Entrepreneurship; excessive start-up; natural resources rents; 
environment. 
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 Entrepreneurship is essential for economic growth (Baumol, 1968, Schumpeter, 
1965). This well-established statement, which originated from neo-classical economic 
theory, implies that more entrepreneurial activity is always better for any economy 
(Nguyen, 2019, Nguyen et al.). Also, entrepreneurial activity is often found to have strong 
links with innovation (Fuentelsaz et al., 2018), which plays an important role in securing 
the long-term survival of the economy by constraining overconsumption and mitigating 
climate change. However, too much entrepreneurial activity may not be positive, 
particularly when the number of entrepreneurs exceeds a certain optimal level; Prieger et 
al. (2016) propose the existence of an optimal level of entrepreneurship in each economy. 
Entrepreneurial activity, if it exceeds the optimal level, may negatively influence economic 
growth.  
Meanwhile, in another strand of study, the link between economic growth and 
natural resources has been examined mainly under the “resource curse” hypothesis, which 
states that nations endowed with abundant natural resources are usually cursed with 
stagnant economic development (e.g., Africa) (Canh and Thong, 2020). Ben-Salha et al. 
(2019) provide a model with four explanations for this paradox: (1) the long-term fall of 
primary product prices; (2) the volatility of commodities price; (3) “Dutch disease”; and (4) 
institutional weaknesses. This framework helps us understand why excessive natural 
resources (resource boom) may not always be beneficial to economic growth.  
In this respect, recent studies regard opportunistic entrepreneurs (in contrast to 
social entrepreneurs and sustainable entrepreneurs) as agents that determine the rent-
seeking of natural resources (Canh et al., 2020). For example, Torvik (2002) shows that 
natural resources move productive entrepreneurs into rent-seeking activity, lowering 
national income and welfare. Murphy et al. (1993), Robinson (1994), and Acemoglu (1995) 
suggest that initial rent-seeking activity reinforces itself by crowding out productive 
entrepreneurship from the market. An increase in the number of rent-seekers lowers the 
returns from both rent-seeking and productive entrepreneurship; however, the effect is 
greater on the returns from productive entrepreneurship. Baland and Francois (2000) 




argue that an increase in natural resources enhances domestic rent-seeking when the 
initial proportion of agents engaged in rent-seeking is large.  
  Building on these two strands of literature, our study investigates whether 
excessive entrepreneurial activity above the optimal level has a negative impact on natural 
resource rents. The study provides a mechanism through which economic growth from the 
ecological perspective may be harmed by the presence of too many opportunistic 
entrepreneurs. The study underscores the point that ecological constraints are a significant 
problem for economic growth, leading to the need to reconsider the long-held view that the 
more entrepreneurial activity, the better (Barbier, 2005, Potts et al., 2010).  
Specifically, we propose a positive relationship between excessive 
entrepreneurship and natural resource rents. We acknowledge that entrepreneurship is 
typically associated with innovation and improved efficiency, and thus contributes to 
economic growth (Audretsch and Keilbach, 2004). When there are too many small 
entrepreneurs; however, technological progress stemming from large-scale R&D and scale 
economies may suffer; this lowers economic efficiency (Prieger et al., 2016). Severe 
competition requires economic agents, both newcomers and incumbent firms, to secure 
every opportunity for survival and growth; this makes entrepreneurs more opportunistic, 
and they pursue higher natural resource rents as a result. 
  We test our rent-seeking hypothesis by using a global sample of 70 countries for 
the period 2006-2016. Our empirical settings allow us to control for all relevant 
econometric issues and so generate consistent and reliable results. We conduct a set of 
supplemental analyses on two groups of economies: low and middle-income economies 
(LMEs) and high-income economies (HIEs). We also analyze four natural resources: coal, 
gas, forest, and minerals.  
  Empirically, we find a positive association between excessive entrepreneurial 
activity and natural resource rents. We also find that the natural rent-seeking of excessive 
entrepreneurship is stronger in HIEs than in LMEs and that the effects are greater on 
mineral rents and forest rents than on coal rents and gas rents. Thus, we propose that there 




is an optimal level of entrepreneurship that balances economic growth and environmental 
protection.  
  Our study contributes to the relevant literature in three principal ways. First, it is 
one of the first studies to investigate the relationship between excessive entrepreneurship 
and natural resource rents systematically. We combine the entrepreneurship literature 
with the literature on ecological economics to explain the natural rent-seeking of excessive 
entrepreneurship. Our study subscribes to Prieger et al. (2016)’s proposition that 
entrepreneurial activity above the optimal level reduces economic growth. 
Second, findings in this study extend the emerging strand of research highlighting 
the importance of sustainable entrepreneurial ecosystems. Following Ludeke-Freund 
(2020), we suggest that economic growth should not be seen as the sole ultimate goal of 
entrepreneurship. A sustainable entrepreneurial ecosystem may lead to slower growth 
rates or even de-growth. However, the social and environmental benefits obtained from 
such an ecosystem may be worth pursuing (van Lunenburg et al., 2020). 
Third, we carefully examine the heterogeneity associated with HIEs and LMEs, as 
well as the four types of natural resources. Thus, our findings provide a broad perspective 
on the impact of excessive entrepreneurship on natural resource rents. Finally, our study 
puts forward useful suggestions for policymakers who seek to find a balance between 
boosting entrepreneurship and protecting the environment. 
  We organize this study as follows. In section 2, we provide the literature review. In 
section 3, we present the data and the empirical model. In section 4, we first estimate a 
proxy of excessive entrepreneurship and use the proxy to estimate its impact on natural 
resource rents. We then discuss the empirical results. In section 5, we conclude the study. 
2. Literature Review 
  The relationship between natural resources and entrepreneurial activity is a 
controversial topic in the extant literature. Previous studies mainly focus on testing the 
resource curse hypothesis, which mainly revolves around the question “are nations with 
high resource rents cursed with reduced entrepreneurial activity?” The empirical findings 




against this hypothesis are, unfortunately, mixed and inclusive. For example, Chambers and 
Munemo (2019) test the hypothesis on 116 countries in the period 2001–2012 and show 
that nations with substantial natural resource extraction exhibit limited entrepreneurial 
activity. On the other hand, Ben-Salha et al. (2019), using a sample of top resource-
abundant countries in the period 1970–2013, find evidence that the natural resource 
blessing hypothesis is valid in the long run. 
  In an endeavour to synthesize the literature, Baland and Francois (2000) propose a 
theoretical model which states that the influence of natural resources on entrepreneurial 
activity depends critically on the nature of the equilibrium that existed in the country when 
resources started to increase. When the initial proportion of agents engaged in 
entrepreneurship (innovative activities) is large, an increase in the economy’s resources 
increases domestic entrepreneurship. However, when a large proportion of individuals are 
already engaged in rent-seeking, a resources boom inclines the economy toward more 
rent-seeking. 
Based on previous studies, we argue that resource rent-seeking may increase when 
there is an excessive number of entrepreneurs in an economy. In other words, when 
entrepreneurial activity is held at an appropriate level, entrepreneurs will contribute to 
economic growth by introducing innovations and improving economic efficiency. However, 
when entrepreneurial activity exceeds the equilibrium level, the forces of competition 
(among new firms and between new firms and incumbent firms) may outweigh the 
innovation effect and incentivize entrepreneurs to seek rents from natural resources to 
gain competitive advantage.  
  Before establishing the theoretical mechanisms underpinning the expected non-
linear relationship between resource rent and entrepreneurship, we first define natural 
resources and distinguish natural resource rent from Schumpeterian rent, which are the 
key concepts of our theoretical framework. 
  Natural resources are defined by the World Trade Report as “stocks of materials 
that exist in the natural environment that are both scare and economically useful in the 
production or consumption, either in their raw state or after a minimal amount of 




processing” (Report, 2010). The notion of rent was developed by Tullok to indicate that an 
entity seeks to gain added wealth without any reciprocal contribution of productivity 
(Tullock, 1967).i In this study, we use the term natural resource rent or resource rent to 
indicate the abuse of natural resources by entrepreneurs seeking private gain (e.g., profits, 
business survival, or growth) without adequately contributing to the economy by 
introducing innovations and improving efficiency. 
In contrast, Schumpeterian rent, defined as “the additional value that results from a 
new combination of resources (including new modes of organization) that an entrepreneur 
may have undertaken” (Sautet, 2013). Schumpeterian rent can be seen as abnormal profits 
that entrepreneurs earn from their venture activities and is the driving force behind the 
process of creative destruction (Danneels, 2012). Nonetheless, Schumpeterian rent is 
transient by nature, in the sense that it arises only in situations of disequilibrium when the 
economy shifts from the old modes to new modes. Once the market settles into a new 
equilibrium, these rents disappear (Sautet, 2013). 
  Entrepreneurs who aim to acquire Schumpeterian rent will try to push the 
economy out of its current equilibrium by introducing new products to replace older ones. 
This process of creative destruction is usually associated with innovation, new business 
models, and improved efficiency, which lead to reduced natural resource rent (Stephan et 
al., 2015). However, it is noteworthy that, according to ecological economics, production 
and consumption are fundamentally a linear function of raw material (Chambers and 
Munemo, 2019, Barbier, 2005)1 As such, economic activities will ultimately induce 
amplified resource rents, i.e., an increase in the contributions (in the absolute values) of 
coal, mineral, gas, and forest in GDP (Behrens et al., 2007). This amplified resource rent 
effect may outweigh the creative destruction effect, especially when there is an excessive 
number of entrepreneurs in an economy, for the following reasons.  
  First, facing severe competition, entrepreneurs may become more opportunistic 
and driven by rent-seeking to secure survival and growth opportunities for their business 
ventures (Prieger et al., 2016). Baumol (2004) emphasizes that entrepreneurship should 
                                                          
1 Along with other neoclassical factors, such as labour and capital. 




not be equated to virtuous behaviour: “because we recognize that entrepreneurship can 
bring innovation and growth, we are misled into thinking that it must always contribute to 
economic abundance and expansion.” In fact, the ultimate goal of entrepreneurs is the 
acquisition and accumulation of wealth, power, and prestige, with innovation used as a 
primary weapon (Lafuente et al., 2018). 
  When there are excessive numbers of entrepreneurs, severe competition may 
significantly increase the marginal costs of capital and labour, leading to reduced profit 
margins (Prieger et al., 2016, Lafuente et al., 2018). Entrepreneurs are thus incentivized to 
extract more natural resources (either directly or indirectly), whose marginal cost may 
increase at a slower pace compared to capital and labour. An example of indirect natural 
resource-seeking behaviour is that in highly competitive environments, entrepreneurs may 
seek lower-priced inputs and materials. In response to this pressure, their suppliers may 
adopt natural rent-seeking strategies to meet the requirements of their clients. The reason 
for the relatively low marginal cost of natural resources is primarily due to government 
policies aimed at keeping resources accessible to domestic producers at affordable prices 
to secure nations’ economic health and boost economic development (Haas, 2011). 
  In such circumstances, entrepreneurs may come up with business models that rely 
less on high-skilled human capital (the cost of hiring employees increases in severe 
competition) or on low value-added technology (the cost of funding R&D investments 
increases in severe competition), and employ lower-priced, easy-accessed natural 
resources to make profits (Cressy, 1992, Chell, 2000). Thus, seeking rent from natural 
resources could be regarded as a feasible strategy under situations of acute competition. 
  The second reason is that excessive entrepreneurship not only affects newcomers 
but also influences the behaviour of incumbent firms (Bretschger, 2005). With severe 
competition and a large number of newly-established firms whose operations are more 
flexible and efficient, incumbent firms may become more opportunistic in resource rent-
seeking behaviour to secure their market positions (Buenstorf, 2016). Specifically, Prieger 
et al. (2016) investigating a global sample show that when there are too many small 
businesses, competition in the economy will suffer, with an attendant loss of efficiency in 




the sense that technological progress stemming from large-scale R&D will become 
stagnant. Since R&D takes time and is associated with substantial opportunity costs, 
incumbent firms may decide to direct their investments toward short-term, low-cost but 
resource-consuming technology as a “quick and easy” competition strategy (Wennekers 
and Thurik, 1999). Thus, following Torvik (2002), we argue that the effects of excessive 
competition may outweigh the direct positive effects of improved efficiency and 
innovation. 
  Third, entrepreneurship is a (novel) production process that needs natural inputs. 
Excessive entrepreneurial activity will, therefore, lead to the increased usage of natural 
resources in the economy. Potts et al. (2010) hold an optimistic viewpoint that increasing 
environmental damage or the onset of an impending ecological collapse may present 
entrepreneurial opportunities. We, however, argue that negative externalities (e.g., 
resource rents) cannot be removed entirely by entrepreneurial actions, especially in 
situations of severe competition (Schumpeter, 1965, Torvik, 2002). The reason is that 
entrepreneurs, at the individual level, have no incentive to consider the “big picture” of the 
natural resource extraction in the economy; their ultimate objective is to maximize 
Schumpeterian rents and leave the issue of negative externalities to their government 
(McMullen et al., 2008). Also, Estapé-Dubreuil et al. (2016) find that firms focusing too 
closely on environmental issues (at the same time as social issues) are significantly inferior 
in attracting financial investors. Thus, entrepreneurs facing fierce competition have a 
strong motivation to seek natural resource rents. This undesirable behaviour may 
overshadow their contribution to the economy.  
  In sum, we expect entrepreneurial activity to exert a non-linear (U-shaped) effect 
on a nation’s natural resource rents. Specifically, there is an optimal level of 
entrepreneurship in an economy; entrepreneurial activity exceeding this threshold may 
incentivize economic agents (both new and incumbent) to seek rents from natural 
resources to secure the survival and growth of their business. 
 
 





3. Data and Empirical Model  
Empirical Model 
  Since the aim of this study is to examine the effects of excessive entrepreneurship 
on natural resources rents, we adopt a baseline empirical model of natural resource rents 
as follows: 
                    
                                           [1] 
where  , Y, Inv,           and     represent natural resource rents, national 
income, new investments, urbanization and foreign direct investment, respectively.  
  The baseline model includes economic development (Y) and its vitality (Inv) to 
account for natural resource rents because economic development is one of the main 
drivers and economic activities consume natural resources (e.g., Abdulahi et al. (2019)). In 
terms of social factors, urbanization represents a change in living standards and social 
structure. Urbanization requires heavy use of natural resources, such as cement, steel, 
aluminium, and coal, thereby increasing natural resource rents (Shen et al., 2005). 
Urbanization is usually associated with industrialization processes, which lead to a higher 
demand for natural resources (Mudakkar et al., 2013). Meanwhile, trade openness and FDI 
inflows are a proxy for economic integration (Hajzler, 2014, Ndikumana and Sarr, 2019, 
Phuc Nguyen et al., 2019), which may exert either a negative or positive impact on natural 
resource rents through the pollution haven or pollution halo hypotheses (Phuc Nguyen et 
al., 2019). Finally, the square term of the income level is added into the model to control for 
the environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) hypothesis, which proposes a non-linear 
relationship between economic development and environmental degradation.  
  To investigate the influence of excessive entrepreneurial activity on natural 
resources rents, we add a set of dummy variables (DUM) representing excessive 
entrepreneurship to the baseline model. The empirical model is as follows: 
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Data 
 We collect the new business density (new registrations per 1,000 people ages 15-
64) from World Development Indicators (WDIs – World Bank) and take logarithms as a 
proxy for entrepreneurial activity. This entrepreneurship rate is employed in the next 
paragraph to estimate the level of excessive entrepreneurship, which is the level of 
entrepreneurial activity that exceeds the optimal level of entrepreneurship in an economy. 
We should, in principle, identify the optimal level of entrepreneurship for every economy. 
Although there is no consensus in the literature on what is the optimal level of 
entrepreneurship, Prieger et al. (2016) completed one of the most critical studies on this 
topic, proposing that a country will suffer a “growth penalty” when entrepreneurship 
deviates from its optimal level. Prieger et al. (2016) put forward the following equation: 
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in which i and t denote country i in year t, respectively; y is national output and y* is 
national output at optimal entrepreneurship; TEA is total entrepreneurship rate and TEA* 
is the optimal level of entrepreneurship rate;   is a country-specific term, and   is the 
residual term. From the equation, we can extrapolate the optimal level of entrepreneurship 
as follows: 
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in which (     
 
  
) represents the output gap in the economic literature 
(Orphanides and Norden, 2002). To limit the feedback effect from entrepreneurship on 
economic growth (Galindo and Méndez, 2014), which would lead to the problem of 
endogeneity, the study further transforms Eq. [4] by using a one-year lag of output gap in 
empirical estimation: 
       
  
                (        
 
    
)               [5] 




At this stage, we face a new issue, i.e., the estimation of the output gap, which is one 
of the most debated topics in the economic literature (Orphanides and Norden, 2002). 
Therefore, we apply several strategies to estimate output gaps as a way of reducing 
concerns related to technical biases.  
  First, we use a traditional way of estimating the log of real GDP for year (time 
factor) to extract real GDP variable from cyclicality and trend factors (Clark, 1987). In the 
estimation, the trend series represent long-term development while the cyclicality 
represents the short-term fluctuation surrounding the long-term trend. That is, the 
cyclicality (or the residual from this estimation) is divided by its trend to get a 
standardized percentage, which forms the output gap. This measure of the output gap is 
then included in Eq. (3) to estimate excessive entrepreneurship. This method is, however, a 
naïve technique since it only concerns a time-trend over the long-term. So, the study 
applies a second technique to estimate the output gap by recruiting the Hodrick-Prescott 
(HP) filter (Hodrick and Prescott, 1997) to estimate the cyclical factor of real GDP and then 
includes the result into Eq. [3] as the output gap as well. There are criticisms of the HP filter 
(e.g., see Hamilton (2018)), and so we use it as one of several ways to estimate the output 
gap and the excessive entrepreneurship activity as a robustness check. Also, we estimate 
real GDP growth rate with one-year lag and then extract the residual term to divide by the 
fitted value from the estimations as the third proxy of the output gap. 
  After the estimation of Eq. [5] with three different proxies of the output gap and the 
residual terms predicted, we create a set of dummy variables (DUM1, DUM2, DUM3) which 
represents the existence of excessive entrepreneurship by the rule that if the residual term 
is positive, the dummy value is 1, suggesting the existence of excessive entrepreneurship; 
otherwise, the value is 0. The logic here is that the fitted value from Eq. [5] is the assumed 
optimal level of entrepreneurship. As such, if the residual is greater than zero, the actual 
value of the entrepreneurship rate is higher than the optimal level, indicating the existence 
of excessive entrepreneurship.  
  The above methods drawing on Prieger et al. (2016) do not consider other socio-
economic determinants of entrepreneurship (Ramos-Rodríguez et al., 2012, Sasu and Sasu, 




2015, Thai and Turkina, 2014). Thus, the methods might be weak in capturing all the 
information about entrepreneurial activity. Therefore, in this study, we go further to 
incorporate a comprehensive list of covariates and estimate the optimal level of 
entrepreneurship using a stepwise strategy. 
  We first estimate the entrepreneurship rate with a one-year lag and assume that 
any variation from its long-term trend is a cyclical factor of entrepreneurship. Then, we 
estimate the entrepreneurship rate using its one-year lag, as well as the income level (log of 
real GDP per capita). Previous studies (Dvouletý, 2018, Ramos-Rodríguez et al., 2012, Thai 
and Turkina, 2014) have concluded that the trend in entrepreneurship is a function of 
income level, which represents economic development. Our model also includes covariates 
such as economic growth, unemployment rate, human capital, institutional quality, and 
economic freedom. These factors are well documented in the extant literature as critical 
drivers of entrepreneurial activity (Fuentelsaz et al., 2019, Chowdhury et al., 2019, 
Chambers and Munemo, 2019). Applying the same procedure, we extract the residuals 
from each estimation and divide by their fitted value obtained from the estimations. The 
dummy variables (DUM4, DUM5, DUM6) are created following the principle that if the 
residuals are greater than zero, the value is 1, suggesting the existence of excessive 
entrepreneurship; otherwise, the value is 0. 
[insert Table 1 here] 
  Table 1 presents estimates of excessive entrepreneurship. In Model (1), we divide 
the residual term from Model (1) by real GDP to calculate the output gap in percentage 
form. In Model (2), we use the output gap from Model (1) as a regressor and predict the 
residual term from Model (2) to measure the dummy variable (DUM1) of excessive 
entrepreneurship. DUM1 equals 1 if the residual from Model (2) is greater than 0; 
otherwise, DUM1 equals 0.2  
                                                          
2 The correlation between the log of entrepreneurship density (-1) and output gap (-1) is 0.08, and the 
(variance inflation factor) VIF test shows no evidence of multicollinearity (VIF<10) between the two 
independent variables in Model (2). 
 




  In Model (3), we measure the cyclical factor of real GDP by the cyclical factor from 
the HP filter for the log of real GDP. We use the residual of Model (3) to measure the 
dummy variable (DUM2) of excessive entrepreneurship, which equals 1 if the residual from 
Model (3) is greater than 0. In Model (4), we regress the real GDP growth rate with a one-
year lag and plug its residual into Model (5). In Model (5), we regress the log of 
entrepreneurship density with a one-year lag and the residual from Model (4). Likewise, 
we use the residual of Model (5) to measure the dummy variable (DUM3) of excessive 
entrepreneurship. 
  In Model (6), we regress the log of entrepreneurship density with a one-year lag. 
We use the residual of Model (6) to measure the dummy variable (DUM4) of excessive 
entrepreneurship, which equals 1 if the residual is larger 0; otherwise, it equals 0. In Model 
(7), we regress the log of entrepreneurship density with a one-year lag and the log of real 
GDP per capita (one-year lag). Then, we use the residual of Model (7) to estimate the 
dummy variable (DUM5) of excessive entrepreneurship in the same way. In Model (8), we 
regress the log of entrepreneurship density with a one-year lag, the log of real GDP per 
capita (one-year lag), unemployment rate (one-year lag), one-year lag of log of the human 
capital index (from PWT), one-year lag of the average of six institutional indicators from 
worldwide governance indicators (World Bank), and one-year lag of the economic freedom 
index. We use the residual of Model (8) to measure the dummy variable (DUM6) of 
excessive entrepreneurship. 
Of the variables used, real GDP per capita and economic growth rate are collected from 
WDIs, the human capital index is collected from Penn World Tables 9.1 (PWT), six 
institutional indicators are collected from (World Bank), and the economic freedom index 
is collected from the Heritage Foundation. The percentage of total natural resource rents to 
GDP (NRR) is collected from WDIs. According to the World Bank, the NRR is measured by 
the difference between the value of production at world prices and total cost of production. 
That is, the value of natural resources in GDP can represent the increase in prices of natural 
resource rents and also the higher abuse of natural resources. Even with the increases in 
prices or abuse of natural resources, any increase in natural resource values in GDP would 
reflect the higher dependence of the economy on natural resources and can imply a higher 




level of exploitation of natural resources. Gross capital formation (% of GDP), urban 
population to total population (%), total trade value (% of GDP), foreign direct investment 
net inflows (% of GDP) are collected from WDIs to proxy for income level (Income), 
population density (Popden), capital formation (Cap), urbanization (Urban), trade openness 
(Trade), and FDI inflows (FDI) respectively.  
There are missing data in entrepreneurship density, coal rents, mineral rents, and 
natural gas rents in several countries including some countries with high natural resources 
rents such as Gulf Cooperation Council countries. Furthermore, some countries have 
missing data on other variables.3 By matching all variables, we choose the final sample 
consisting with 70 economies and two subsamples (34 high-income economies [HIEs] and 
46 low and middle-income economies [LMEs]) over the period 2006–2016 (see Table A1, 
Appendix, for the list of countries and data description of two subsamples). All variables, 
definitions, calculations and data description are presented in Table 1. 
[insert Table 2 here] 
4. Results and Discussion 
  Our sample has a large N (70 countries) over a relatively short-time period (2006–
2016). So, the Pesaran’s CD test Pesaran (2004) is employed to check the cross-sectional 
dependence. According to De Hoyos and Sarafidis (2006), cross-sectional dependence in 
the errors exists in panel-data estimates, which may be due to the presence of common 
shocks and unobserved components (Robertson and Symons, 2000, Pesaran, 2004). We 
also expect strong interdependencies in economic factors among countries in this highly 
integrated gobal economy. De Hoyos and Sarafidis (2006) explain that coefficient estimates 
of fixed and random effects panel data models are not consistent if there is correlation 
between regressors and unobserved components that creates interdependencies across 
cross-sections. In this case, Pesaran (2006) proposed the panel corrected standard errors 
(PCSE) as an appropriate estimate (De Hoyos and Sarafidis, 2006). 
Results obtained from the CD test are incorporated in the last column of Table 1. The 
results indicate the existence of cross-sectional dependence in all the variables. In this 
                                                          
3 Upon request, we can provide details about dropped countries and missing data.  




context, the panel corrected standard errors model (PCSE) is argued as a robust estimator 
(Marques and Fuinhas, 2012, Jönsson, 2005, Bailey and Katz, 2011); thus, it is recruited as 
the primary estimator in this study. Furthermore, we also employ a set of alternative 
estimators, including feasible generalized least squares (FGLS), pooled OLS, robust pooled 
OLS, pooled OLS with year effects for robustness check. 
  More importantly, in this study, we employ techniques to ensure robustness, 
consistency, and unbiased results. Specifically, each control variable is added to the 
estimation one by one. The same procedure is applied for the subsamples. Also, we analyze 
different types of natural resource rents (besides total natural resource rents), including 
coal rents (CoalR), mineral rents (MineR), natural gas rents (GasR), and forest rents 
(ForestR). 
[insert Table 3 here] 
  We report the main empirical results in Table 3, in which the coefficient estimates 
of ten different models are presented. Model (1) denotes a basic model, including our 
primary variable of excessive entrepreneurship (DUM1) along with income and its square 
term. Then, we add other control variables cumulatively to the basic model from Model (2) 
to (5); this is to check whether our results are subject to multicollinearity due to 
correlation between the variables. Model (5) represents a full model, including all the 
control variables. Models (1) to (5) show that estimations are not sensitive to included 
controls. So, we proceed to check whether empirical results are robust to alternative 
measures of excessive entrepreneurship in Models (7) to (10). Models (5) to (10) show that 
estimations are robust in measuring excessive entrepreneurship4. 
Regarding control variables, income level has a significant positive impact on 
natural resource rents while its square term has a significant negative impact, confirming 
the EKC hypothesis. When we investigate coal rents (CoalR), mineral rents (MineR), natural 
gas rents (GasR), and forest rents (ForestR) separately, we find an inverted U-shaped curve 
for coal rents. This finding contrasts with other types of rent, with a U-shaped curve for gas 
                                                          
4 We also check the robustness of the results by adding institutional quality as a control variable; the results 
are consistent and robust. The detailed results are available on request. 




rents and forest rents and a decreasing line for mineral rents (see Table A2-3 in Appendix). 
The inverted U-shape relationship in coal rents might be associated with the U-shape 
relationship in natural gas. As income increases, a country substitutes less environmentally 
damaging natural gas for more damaging coal in the production input mix (Stern, 2004, 
Canh et al., 2019, Phuc Nguyen et al., 2019). Regarding forest and mineral rents, the 
proportion of these resources in GDP decreases as a country develops from a primary 
industry-based economy to a manufacturing industry-based economy. However, wood 
products are demanded more as natural substitutes for plastic or other artificial products 
in consumption as income further increases. 
Urbanization and FDI inflows have significant positive impacts, increasing natural 
resource rents. In contrast, trade openness has a significant negative impact on natural 
resource rents.  
From now on, we will concentrate our discussion on excessive entrepreneurship. 
Estimations in Table 3 show significant positive impacts of excessive entrepreneurship, as 
represented by dummy variables on natural resource rents; this implies that excessive 
entrepreneurship increases natural resource rents. Our results are robust for all six 
dummy variables, which are estimated obtained by different strategies. Thus, the results 
provide strong evidence of the negative impact of excessive entrepreneurship on natural 
resource rents.  
  Our results show that excessive entrepreneurial activity incentivizes 
entrepreneurs to seek natural resource rents; this confirms our presumption that too much 
entrepreneurial activity may harm the economy. Our results are in line with previous 
studies. For example, (Baumol, 2004) suggests that the adverse effect of excessive 
entrepreneurship stems from severe competition among entrepreneurs and between start-
up firms and incumbent firms. (Prieger et al., 2016) show that technological progress 
stemming from large-scale R&D and scale economies may suffer when there are too many 
small entrepreneurs, lowering economic efficiency.  
  Too many entrepreneurs in the economy make them more opportunistic in 
securing survival and growth opportunities. Although our results are surprising, they are 




deep-rooted. Subscribing to Prieger et al. (2016) and Lafuente et al. (2018), we propose 
that there is an optimal level of entrepreneurship yielding a balance between economic 
growth and environmental protection. 
In this saying, findings in our study echo the thesis of the sustainable 
entrepreneurship literature, which argues that entrepreneurship does not follow the “more 
is better” principle. Also, it is important to encourage other types of entrepreneurship, such 
as social entrepreneurship and sustainable entrepreneurship, whose discovery, creation, 
and exploitation of opportunities to create future goods and services also sustain the 
natural and/or communal environment and provide development gain for others 
(Volkmann et al., 2019). Our findings also imply that to achieve sustainable society and 
economy, we should approach the concept of entrepreneurship not only from the neo-
classical economic viewpoint (which highlights profit maximization) but also from the need 
to incorporate viewpoints from social science including co-evolution and co-creation 
(which emphasize collective sustainability). 
  Now we investigate the relationship between excessive entrepreneurship and 
natural resource rents for the two subsamples of HIEs and LMEs. Estimations in Table 4 
show the significant positive impact of excessive entrepreneurship on natural resource 
rents in HIEs. However, those in Table 5 show the positive impact but with weaker 
statistical significance in LMEs, which implies that the natural rent-seeking of excessive 
entrepreneurship might be much significant in HIEs than in LMEs.  
[insert Table 4, 5 here] 
  Our results are consistent with Prieger et al. (2016) and suggest that 
entrepreneurship is close to its optimal level in developed countries, whereas the level of 
entrepreneurship is much lower than its optimal rate in developing countries. That is, 
entrepreneurs are not excessive in number in LMEs. As another explanation, LMEs are so 
diverse in their abundance of natural resources that this produces the insignificance. For 
example, entrepreneurs do not have access to natural resources in some LMEs. Previous 
studies show that entrepreneurship heterogeneity among the country groups has not been 
fully investigated (Behrens et al., 2007). In this respect, this study acknowledges that 




countries possess different entrepreneurship levels depending on the development phase, 
resulting in different degrees of natural rent-seeking. 
 
Robustness check 
  To check the robustness of the empirical results, we first conduct a set of analysis 
on different types of natural resources, including coal, minerals, gas, and forest. Estimation 
results for different types of natural resource rents are reported in Table A2, A3, A4, 
Appendix.  
  Specifically, Table A2 presents estimations for coal rents and mineral rents. Table 
A3 and A4 show estimations for natural gas rents, forest rents, and oil rents, respectively. 
The estimations are consistent with our main findings and confirm the positive 
relationship between excessive entrepreneurship and natural resource rents. Specifically, 
the results show a set of consistent positive impacts of excessive entrepreneurship on 
mineral rents and forest rents, while there is weaker evidence of the effects of excessive 
entrepreneurship on coal rents and natural gas rents. 
These findings indicate that natural resource rents are multidimensional, and 
entrepreneurs are keen on seeking rents from specific natural resources. Specifically, 
mineral rents and forest rents are most likely employed by entrepreneurs to build their 
competitive advantages since these resources are relatively accessible, especially in 
developing countries (Munasinghe et al., 2019, Elbra, 2013). Also, these two types of 
natural resources are crucial to many industry and production processes. As such, when 
the number of entrepreneurial activities exceeds the optimal level, they are keen on 
abusing these two kinds of resources to establish competitive advantages. Meanwhile, coal 
and gas are fuel and are strictly controlled by the states with careful management of the 
supply and demand (Towler et al., 2016, Lin and Liu, 2010). As such, when the number of 
entrepreneurial activities exceeds the optimal level, they are less likely to abuse these two 
types of resources. 




Overall, our findings indicate that severe competition requires entrepreneurs to 
secure every opportunity for survival and growth. The consequence of this behaviour is 
that entrepreneurs become opportunistic, and they pursue higher natural resource rents as 
a result. Also, there is evidence that entrepreneurship is close to its optimal level in 
developed countries, whereas the level of entrepreneurship is much lower than its optimal 
rate in developing countries. Therefore, the pressure on natural resources rents is more 
substantial in developed countries than it is in developing countries. Finally, we find that 
entrepreneurs are more likely to seek mineral rents and forest rents under severe 
competition leaving coal rents and natural gas rents to a lesser extent. 
5. Conclusions 
  Governments usually hold natural resources at an affordable price to support 
domestic firms. As competition intensifies, the marginal costs of both financial and human 
capital increase relative to those of natural resources. Firms facing severe competition seek 
more rent from natural resources as the number of entrepreneurs grows. Increasing 
natural resource rents harms the environment and economic sustainability. In this context, 
we investigate the impacts of excessive entrepreneurial activity on natural resource rents 
at the national level. 
  We test the proposed hypothesis using a global sample of 70 countries over 11 
years (2006-2016) and find consistent evidence supporting the negative effects of 
excessive entrepreneurship on natural resource rents. Our findings are consistent across 
different specifications and estimation methods.  
  Our study makes three important contributions to the existing literature on 
ecological entrepreneurship. First, the study proposes that there is an optimal level of 
entrepreneurship which yields a balance between economic growth and environmental 
protection. Second, this study shows that the natural rent-seeking of excessive 
entrepreneurship is more significant in HIEs than in LMEs. Third, this study suggests that 
natural resource rents are multidimensional, and entrepreneurs prefer rents from specific 
resources among coal, minerals, gas, and forest. 




Besides these contributions to ecological entrepreneurship, this study is also 
relevant to the literature examining sustainable and social entrepreneurship. Given that 
(too much) opportunistic entrepreneurship may boost natural resource rents and harm the 
environment, it is essential to encourage sustainable and social entrepreneurship that 
incorporate sustainability into their development ideology. While social entrepreneurship 
aims to solve social problems, sustainable entrepreneurship is more concerned with 
natural and environmental issues (Tiba et al., 2019). Unfortunately, the extant literature 
focuses more on explaining the precedents of creating social/sustainable businesses rather 
than examining their impact on the economy and society (Arru, 2020, Bischoff, 2019). 
Future studies may thus seek to investigate the relationship between sustainable 
entrepreneurship and natural resource rents or environmental protection. Understanding 
the contributions of sustainable entrepreneurship helps underpin its importance in 
mainstream literature.  
The findings of this study are most relevant to policymakers concerned with 
boosting entrepreneurship while balancing environmental protection. Authorities should 
be aware of the existence of the optimal level of entrepreneurship. Excessive 
entrepreneurial activity adversely affects the sustainability of economic development since 
it incentivizes natural resource rent-seeking that harms the environments. In this sense, we 
recommend that policymakers focus on encouraging innovative and productive activities. 
By selectively supporting high value-added entrepreneurship, authorities can signal that 
not all venture activities are welcome; this will reduce unnecessary competition and 
moderate rent-seeking behaviour. Also, our findings imply that policymakers should 
consider the heterogeneity of types of natural resources and the levels of economic 
development when identifying the desired levels of entrepreneurship. 
This study focuses on the impact of excessive entrepreneurship on natural 
resources rents, which are an important component of environmental resilience. The study 
indicates several research directions for future studies. First, new business density used in 
the study may be too broad and goes far beyond any definition of entrepreneurship 
activity. Specifically, there are differences in the characteristics of entrepreneurship 




activities, i.e. high-tech entrepreneurship versus low-tech, profit-driven entrepreneurship 
versus sustainable entrepreneurship, or formal versus informal entrepreneurship.  
The investigations on the impact of these different types of entrepreneurship will 
enrich the literature. Unfortunately, the data from the World Bank on entrepreneurship 
density is the best available, which limits further investigations. Second, future studies can 
expand concerns about the impact of excessive entrepreneurship activity to other aspects 
of the economy, such as environmental protection, social inequality and individual 
happiness. It would be of valueaable to consider the influence of excessive 
entrepreneurship activity on the survival of the economy in terms of these factors.  
Our study presents a starting point for the literature of entrepreneurship and 
natural resources economics about the linkages between two factors. Further, the study 
offers a reflection on the balance between entrepreneurial activities and the need to 
protect natural resources in future studies. We challenge the long-lasting assumption that 
entrepreneurship is always good. Future studies might want to explore more about the 
“dark side” of entrepreneurship to yield relevant policy implications relating to boosting 
environments. This strand of research would make significant contributions to the 
literature of sustainable development. 
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Table 1. Estimations of excessive entrepreneurship 



















































































































































Economic growth (-1)    0.212***    0.007 
    [0.039]    [0.009] 
Log of Entrepreneurship density (-1)  0.980*** 0.979***  0.980*** 0.979*** 0.976***  
  [0.007] [0.006]  [0.007] [0.007] [0.009]  
Output gap (-1)  -0.001       
  [0.001]       
Year 0.028        
 [0.020]        
Cyclical factor of real GDP (-1)   -1.482***      
   [0.298]      
Residual from economic growth (-1)     -0.003    
     [0.004]    
Log of real GDP per capita (-)       0.004 0.115* 
       [0.009] [0.063] 
Unemployment rate (-)        0.061*** 
        [0.007] 
Log of human capital index (-1)        1.187*** 
        [0.205] 
Average of six institutional indicators (-)        0.362*** 
        [0.105] 
Economic freedom index (-)        0.039*** 
        [0.007] 
Constant -29.844 0.039*** 0.039*** 4.769*** 0.032*** 0.040*** 0.006 -4.842*** 
 [40.747] [0.010] [0.009] [0.932] [0.010] [0.010] [0.077] [0.665] 
Observations 770 700 700 700 630 700 700 700 
R-squared 0.002 0.969 0.970 0.550 0.968 0.969 0.969 0.575 
Note: standard errors are in []; *, **, *** are significant levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
  




Table 2. Variables, definitions, measurements, sources, data description and CD tests 
Variable Definitions Measurements Sources Obs Mean SD. Min Max CD-test 
NRR Natural resources rents Total natural resources rents (% of GDP) WDIs 770 3.47 5.10 0.00 32.55 38.50*** 
CoalR Coal rents Coal rents (% of GDP) WDIs 770 0.19 0.60 0.00 7.85 30.44*** 
MineR Mineral rents Mineral rents (% of GDP) WDIs 770 1.41 3.12 0.00 20.92 18.96*** 
GasR Natural gas rents Natural gas rents (% of GDP) WDIs 770 0.32 0.76 0.00 4.89 22.84*** 
ForestR Forest rents Forest rents (% of GDP) WDIs 770 0.50 0.97 0.00 8.58 10.41*** 
Income Income level Log of GDP per capita (constant 2010 US$) WDIs 770 9.20 1.32 6.13 11.63 75.12*** 
Cap Capital formation Gross capital formation (% of GDP) WDIs 766 24.43 5.86 12.32 44.31 31.01*** 
Urban Urbanization Urban population (% of total) WDIs 770 65.04 18.80 15.46 100.00 82.15*** 
Trade Trade openness Trade (% of GDP) WDIs 770 95.64 59.71 20.72 441.60 29.15*** 
FDI FDI inflows Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% 
of GDP) 
WDIs 770 5.98 14.92 -58.32 252.31 23.46*** 
Data description for the estimations of excessive entrepreneurship 
Residual from model (1) 770 0.000 1.777 -3.343 3.392 
Output gap 770 -0.488 7.045 -15.123 11.751 
Residual from model (2) 700 0.000 0.227 -2.174 1.369 
Cyclical factor from HP filter for log of real GDP 770 0.000 0.029 -0.125 0.139 
Residual from model (3) 700 0.000 0.224 -2.191 1.385 
Residual from model (4) 700 0.000 2.529 -12.856 19.758 
Residual from model (5) 630 0.000 0.230 -2.158 1.396 
Residual from model (6) 700 0.000 0.228 -2.161 1.383 
Residual from model (7) 700 0.000 0.228 -2.154 1.388 
Residual from model (8) 700 0.000 0.848 -2.206 2.637 
Note: WDIs is World Development Indicators database, World Bank (version Apr/2019); Fred is economic database of Federal reserve system of St. Lousis (US); in CD test: Under the null 
hypothesis of cross-section independence, CD ~ N(0,1), p-values close to zero indicate data are correlated across panel groups. 
 
  




Table 3. Excessive entrepreneurship and natural resources rents 
Dep. var: NRR (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Income 2.680*** 3.461*** 0.993* -0.014 0.193 0.200 0.167 0.153 0.129 -0.544 
 [0.698] [0.588] [0.547] [0.515] [0.467] [0.451] [0.476] [0.469] [0.463] [0.498] 
Income^2 -0.213*** -0.250*** -0.145*** -0.078*** -0.089*** -0.088*** -0.087*** -0.087*** -0.085*** -0.049* 
 [0.039] [0.034] [0.032] [0.030] [0.028] [0.027] [0.028] [0.028] [0.028] [0.029] 
DUM1 0.760** 0.687** 0.670* 0.724** 0.710**      
 [0.363] [0.334] [0.343] [0.361] [0.356]      
DUM2      0.770*     
      [0.408]     
DUM3       0.730**    
       [0.365]    
DUM4        0.617*   
        [0.338]   
DUM5         0.605*  
         [0.330]  
DUM6          2.538*** 
          [0.342] 
Cap 
 
0.008 0.021 0.037 0.038 0.034 0.036 0.039 0.039 0.033 
 
 
[0.029] [0.026] [0.026] [0.026] [0.026] [0.027] [0.026] [0.026] [0.027] 
Urban 
  
0.053*** 0.055*** 0.054*** 0.052*** 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.059*** 
 
  
[0.003] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.003] 
Trade 
   
-0.014*** -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.015*** 
 
   
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
FDI 
    
0.014** 0.014** 0.014** 0.015** 0.014** 0.010* 
 
    
[0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.006] 
Cons. -3.268 -7.431*** 2.405 6.619*** 5.787*** 5.810*** 5.872*** 5.986*** 6.079*** 7.964*** 
 [2.976] [2.244] [2.163] [1.934] [1.746] [1.675] [1.813] [1.756] [1.722] [1.720] 
Observations 770 766 766 766 766 766 766 766 766 766 
R-squared 0.098 0.091 0.106 0.128 0.130 0.131 0.130 0.129 0.129 0.189 
No. of countries 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 
Note: standard errors are in []; *, **, *** are significant levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
  




Table 4. Excessive entrepreneurship and natural resources rents: high income economies 
Dep. var: NRR (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Income -35.193*** -34.756*** -34.401*** -52.286*** -52.293*** -50.835*** -51.422*** -51.434*** -51.678*** -51.603*** 
 [1.883] [2.051] [1.805] [2.718] [2.711] [2.544] [2.360] [2.534] [2.308] [2.245] 
Income^2 1.702*** 1.681*** 1.639*** 2.526*** 2.527*** 2.457*** 2.484*** 2.487*** 2.497*** 2.490*** 
 [0.092] [0.099] [0.088] [0.134] [0.133] [0.125] [0.116] [0.125] [0.114] [0.112] 
DUM1 1.007** 1.005** 0.867** 0.918** 0.918**      
 [0.422] [0.420] [0.400] [0.405] [0.406]      
DUM2      0.804**     
      [0.342]     
DUM3       0.821**    
       [0.361]    
DUM4        0.915**   
        [0.387]   
DUM5         0.713*  
         [0.374]  
DUM6          0.922** 
          [0.371] 
Cap 
 
0.008 0.009 0.026** 0.026** 0.019 0.016 0.020* 0.024** 0.035** 
 
 
[0.018] [0.010] [0.013] [0.013] [0.012] [0.011] [0.011] [0.012] [0.017] 
Urban 
  
0.063*** 0.067*** 0.067*** 0.067*** 0.068*** 0.067*** 0.068*** 0.075*** 
 
  
[0.003] [0.005] [0.005] [0.006] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.006] 
Trade 
   
-0.017*** -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.016*** 
 
   
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
FDI 
    
-0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 
    
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] 
Cons. 182.138*** 179.652*** 175.788*** 266.743*** 266.777*** 259.414*** 262.431*** 262.297*** 263.730*** 262.639*** 
 [9.660] [10.821] [9.201] [13.682] [13.624] [12.830] [11.885] [12.735] [11.544] [10.757] 
Observations 374 374 374 374 374 374 374 374 374 374 
R-squared 0.072 0.072 0.119 0.237 0.237 0.232 0.232 0.237 0.230 0.237 
No. of countries 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 
Note: standard errors are in []; *, **, *** are significant levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
  




Table 5. Excessive entrepreneurship and natural resources rents in low and middle income economies (LMEs) 
Dep. var: NRR (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Income -4.994*** -5.405*** -7.521*** -6.236*** -6.073*** -7.234*** -7.078*** -7.081*** -6.599*** -1.626 
 [1.506] [1.562] [2.039] [2.096] [1.834] [1.618] [1.631] [1.631] [1.739] [2.211] 
Income^2 0.335*** 0.374*** 0.485*** 0.408*** 0.408*** 0.482*** 0.473*** 0.472*** 0.440*** 0.105 
 [0.096] [0.098] [0.121] [0.125] [0.109] [0.096] [0.096] [0.097] [0.103] [0.134] 
DUM1 1.341* 1.209* 1.203* 1.206* 1.075*      
 [0.705] [0.645] [0.640] [0.636] [0.627]      
DUM2      0.484     
      [0.689]     
DUM3       0.475    
       [0.706]    
DUM4        0.333   
        [0.588]   
DUM5         0.854  
         [0.567]  
DUM6          3.739*** 
          [0.386] 
Cap 
 
0.000 0.010 0.014 -0.028 -0.025 -0.025 -0.024 -0.026 -0.058 
 
 
[0.037] [0.037] [0.038] [0.038] [0.037] [0.037] [0.037] [0.037] [0.041] 
Urban 
  
0.023*** 0.021*** 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.030*** 
 
  
[0.007] [0.007] [0.009] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.008] [0.007] 
Trade 
   
-0.008** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.029*** 
 
   
[0.004] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.006] 
FDI 
    
0.345*** 0.348*** 0.347*** 0.354*** 0.345*** 0.325*** 
 
    
[0.094] [0.094] [0.095] [0.095] [0.093] [0.080] 
Cons. 22.768*** 23.407*** 31.709*** 26.993*** 27.314*** 31.986*** 31.339*** 31.465*** 29.467*** 10.158 
 [6.003] [6.675] [8.470] [8.655] [7.597] [6.776] [6.836] [6.792] [7.230] [8.818] 
Observations 396 392 392 392 392 392 392 392 392 392 
R-squared 0.020 0.024 0.026 0.028 0.054 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.050 0.145 
No. of countries 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 
Note: standard errors are in []; *, **, *** are significant levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 





Table A1. List of countries 
34 High income economies (HIEs) 
Australia Denmark Israel New Zealand Slovenia 
Austria Estonia Italy Norway Spain 
Belgium Finland Korea, Rep. Panama Sweden 
Chile France Latvia Poland Switzerland 
Croatia Germany Lithuania Portugal United Kingdom 
Cyprus Hungary Luxembourg Singapore Uruguay 
Czech Republic Ireland Netherlands Slovak Republic 
36 Low and middle income economies (LMEs) 
Albania India Mauritius Pakistan Senegal 
Armenia Indonesia Mexico Paraguay South Africa 
Bolivia Jamaica Moldova Peru Tajikistan 
Botswana Jordan Morocco Philippines Thailand 
Brazil Kazakhstan Namibia Romania Turkey 
Costa Rica Kyrgyz Republic Nepal Russian Federation Ukraine 
Dominican Republic Malaysia Nigeria Rwanda Zambia 
El Salvador    
Mean (Standard deviation) for subsamples 
Variable High income economies Low and middle-income economies 
NRR 1.47 (3.36) 5.35 (5.70) 
CoalR 0.08 (0.29) 0.29 (0.77) 
MineR 0.70 (2.88) 2.09 (3.19) 
GasR 0.16 (0.46) 0.48 (0.94) 
ForestR 0.20 (0.31) 0.77 (1.26) 
Income 10.31 (0.64) 8.16 (0.87) 
Cap 23.52 (5.26) 25.30 (6.26) 
Urban 75.82 (12.81) 54.85 (17.87) 
Trade 116.2 (73.7) 76.21 (32.08) 
FDI 8.26 (20.97) 3.83 (2.98) 
EnDen 1.42 (0.88) -0.03 (1.26) 
Notes:  Number of observations are 374 and 396 for HIEs and LMEs, respectively. 




 Table A2. Excessive entrepreneurship and coal rents, mineral rents 
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Dep. Var: CoalR MineR 
Income 0.646*** 0.647*** 0.646*** 0.646*** 0.647*** 0.626*** -1.009*** -1.003*** -1.032*** -1.034*** -1.054*** -1.267*** 
 [0.063] [0.063] [0.064] [0.064] [0.063] [0.057] [0.351] [0.343] [0.361] [0.362] [0.358] [0.382] 
Income^2 -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.034*** -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.012 
 [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.003] [0.017] [0.017] [0.018] [0.018] [0.018] [0.019] 
DUM1 -0.011      0.523***      
 [0.036]      [0.150]      
DUM2  -0.008      0.578***     
  [0.041]      [0.167]     
DUM3   -0.025      0.487***    
   [0.039]      [0.153]    
DUM4    -0.019      0.525***   
    [0.033]      [0.152]   
DUM5     -0.019      0.517***  
     [0.035]      [0.154]  
DUM6      0.083***      0.769*** 
      [0.018]      [0.185] 
Cap 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.074*** 0.071*** 0.073*** 0.074*** 0.074*** 0.075*** 
 [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016] 
Urban -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 0.060*** 0.059*** 0.060*** 0.060*** 0.060*** 0.062*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] 
Trade -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
FDI 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.011** 0.011** 0.011** 0.011** 0.011** 0.010** 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] 
Cons. -2.726*** -2.729*** -2.719*** -2.724*** -2.727*** -2.681*** 5.295*** 5.304*** 5.388*** 5.403*** 5.482*** 6.187*** 
 [0.259] [0.259] [0.263] [0.259] [0.258] [0.231] [1.545] [1.514] [1.584] [1.588] [1.569] [1.567] 
Observations 766 766 766 766 766 766 766 766 766 766 766 766 
R-squared 0.047 0.046 0.047 0.047 0.047 0.051 0.151 0.152 0.149 0.151 0.150 0.160 
No. of countries 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 








Table A3. Excessive entrepreneurship and natural gas rents, forest rents 
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Dep. Var: GasR ForestR 
Income -0.283*** -0.281*** -0.282*** -0.285*** -0.285*** -0.359*** -2.004*** -2.005*** -2.008*** -2.006*** -2.008*** -2.075*** 
 [0.081] [0.082] [0.082] [0.081] [0.081] [0.091] [0.076] [0.074] [0.074] [0.076] [0.075] [0.077] 
Income^2 0.010** 0.010** 0.010** 0.010** 0.010** 0.014*** 0.095*** 0.095*** 0.095*** 0.095*** 0.095*** 0.099*** 
 [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.005] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] 
DUM1 0.021      0.049      
 [0.057]      [0.056]      
DUM2  0.034      0.040     
  [0.055]      [0.056]     
DUM3   0.049      0.019    
   [0.049]      [0.051]    
DUM4    -0.003      0.049   
    [0.052]      [0.056]   
DUM5     -0.001      0.042  
     [0.051]      [0.056]  
DUM6      0.284***      0.251*** 
      [0.047]      [0.031] 
Cap -0.015*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.016*** -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.018*** 
 [0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] 
Urban 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.008*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001** 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Trade -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
FDI -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Cons. 2.108*** 2.100*** 2.093*** 2.125*** 2.123*** 2.307*** 11.284*** 11.294*** 11.309*** 11.294*** 11.304*** 11.483*** 
 [0.421] [0.423] [0.421] [0.420] [0.419] [0.437] [0.373] [0.365] [0.367] [0.375] [0.372] [0.365] 
Observations 766 766 766 766 766 766 766 766 766 766 766 766 
R-squared 0.040 0.041 0.041 0.040 0.040 0.074 0.222 0.222 0.222 0.222 0.222 0.239 
No. of countries 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 
Note: standard errors are in []; *, **, *** are significant levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
Table A4. Excessive entrepreneurship and oil rents in full sample 
Dep. var: NRR (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Income 6.314*** 6.307*** 6.346*** 6.321*** 6.322*** 4.961*** 
 [0.601] [0.604] [0.560] [0.607] [0.609] [0.542] 
Income^2 -0.345*** -0.345*** -0.347*** -0.346*** -0.346*** -0.271*** 
 [0.033] [0.033] [0.031] [0.033] [0.034] [0.030] 
DUM1 0.072      
 [0.279]      




DUM2  0.094     
  [0.294]     
DUM3   0.251    
   [0.288]    
DUM4    0.032   
    [0.292]   
DUM5     0.019  
     [0.283]  
DUM6      1.580*** 
      [0.326] 
Cap -0.023 -0.023 -0.024 -0.023 -0.022 -0.029* 
 [0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.017] 
Urban -0.033*** -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.033*** -0.033*** -0.032*** 
 [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] 
Trade -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.019*** 
 [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] 
FDI 0.033*** 0.032*** 0.031*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.023*** 
 [0.010] [0.010] [0.011] [0.010] [0.010] [0.009] 
Cons. -22.494*** -22.463*** -22.689*** -22.508*** -22.511*** -17.219*** 
 [2.108] [2.134] [1.932] [2.127] [2.130] [2.190] 
Observations 495 495 495 495 495 495 
R-squared 0.065 0.065 0.066 0.065 0.065 0.115 
No. of countries 45 45 45 45 45 45 




Table S1. Excessive entrepreneurship and natural resources rents (robustness check with institutional quality as control variable) 
Dep. var: NRR (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Income -1.684*** -1.686*** -1.712*** -1.727*** -1.761*** -2.434*** 
 [0.484] [0.482] [0.505] [0.492] [0.488] [0.564] 
Income^2 0.117*** 0.120*** 0.119*** 0.120*** 0.122*** 0.158*** 
 [0.025] [0.026] [0.027] [0.026] [0.026] [0.034] 
DUM1 0.811**      
 [0.342]      
DUM2  0.898**     
  [0.384]     
DUM3   0.827**    
   [0.362]    
DUM4    0.727**   
    [0.333]   




DUM5     0.734**  
     [0.327]  
DUM6      2.564*** 
      [0.370] 
Cap 0.053** 0.048* 0.051* 0.053** 0.053** 0.048* 
 [0.026] [0.026] [0.026] [0.026] [0.026] [0.027] 
Urban 0.050*** 0.048*** 0.050*** 0.050*** 0.049*** 0.055*** 
 [0.003] [0.004] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] 
Trade -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.013*** 
 [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
FDI 0.010** 0.010* 0.010* 0.010** 0.010** 0.006 
 [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] 
Inst -3.119*** -3.139*** -3.115*** -3.117*** -3.127*** -3.110*** 
 [0.356] [0.354] [0.353] [0.358] [0.357] [0.367] 
Cons. 6.274*** 6.291*** 6.374*** 6.489*** 6.592*** 8.543*** 
 [2.217] [2.166] [2.291] [2.236] [2.214] [2.052] 
Observations 766 766 766 766 766 766 
R-squared 0.179 0.18 0.179 0.178 0.178 0.238 
No. of countries 70 70 70 70 70 70 
Note: standard errors are in []; *, **, *** are significant levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
  




Table S2. Excessive entrepreneurship and natural resources rents in HIEs (robustness check with institutional quality as control variable) 
Dep. var: NRR (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Income -52.671*** -51.702*** -51.934*** -51.935*** -52.196*** -52.015*** 
 [2.742] [2.613] [2.450] [2.619] [2.442] [2.537] 
Income^2 2.452*** 2.406*** 2.416*** 2.418*** 2.428*** 2.417*** 
 [0.133] [0.127] [0.118] [0.127] [0.118] [0.122] 
DUM1 0.823**      
 [0.371]      
DUM2  0.587*     
  [0.305]     
DUM3   0.712**    
   [0.326]    
DUM4    0.798**   
    [0.352]   
DUM5     0.595*  
     [0.339]  
DUM6      0.854*** 
      [0.318] 
Cap 0.039*** 0.034** 0.031** 0.035*** 0.038*** 0.048** 
 [0.015] [0.014] [0.013] [0.013] [0.014] [0.019] 
Urban 0.050*** 0.051*** 0.051*** 0.050*** 0.051*** 0.057*** 
 [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] 
Trade -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.016*** 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
FDI 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] 
Inst 3.433*** 3.383*** 3.440*** 3.419*** 3.443*** 3.456*** 
 [0.234] [0.228] [0.245] [0.242] [0.239] [0.275] 
Cons. 275.588*** 270.663*** 271.933*** 271.727*** 273.283*** 271.702*** 
 [13.817] [13.219] [12.394] [13.204] [12.308] [12.561] 
Observations 374 374 374 374 374 374 
R-squared 0.307 0.300 0.303 0.306 0.300 0.308 
No. of countries 34 34 34 34 34 34 
Note: standard errors are in []; *, **, *** are significant levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
  




Table S3. Excessive entrepreneurship and natural resources rents in LMEs (robustness check with institutional quality as control variable) 
Dep. var: NRR (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Income -2.909* -4.016** -3.808** -3.821** -3.376** 0.650 
 [1.705] [1.653] [1.631] [1.621] [1.665] [1.983] 
Income^2 0.351*** 0.423*** 0.410*** 0.410*** 0.380*** 0.096 
 [0.103] [0.100] [0.099] [0.097] [0.101] [0.111] 
DUM1 1.057*      
 [0.563]      
DUM2  0.678     
  [0.596]     
DUM3   0.651    
   [0.584]    
DUM4    0.454   
    [0.528]   
DUM5     0.892*  
     [0.496]  
DUM6      3.308*** 
      [0.344] 
Cap 0.013 0.015 0.016 0.017 0.015 -0.016 
 [0.036] [0.035] [0.035] [0.035] [0.035] [0.040] 
Urban -0.025*** -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.023*** 0.000 
 [0.008] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] 
Trade -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.011** 
 [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.005] 
FDI 0.343*** 0.342*** 0.340*** 0.350*** 0.343*** 0.327*** 
 [0.092] [0.091] [0.091] [0.094] [0.092] [0.079] 
Inst -5.679*** -5.728*** -5.720*** -5.703*** -5.696*** -5.213*** 
 [0.599] [0.608] [0.610] [0.612] [0.596] [0.651] 
Cons. 3.055 7.328 6.486 6.733 4.926 -9.647 
 [7.441] [7.226] [7.176] [7.184] [7.277] [8.949] 
Observations 392 392 392 392 392 392 
R-squared 0.188 0.182 0.182 0.181 0.185 0.256 
No. of countries 36 36 36 36 36 36 




                                                          
i This meaning of rent or rent-seeking should be distinguished from Ricardian rent, which is a surplus earning above the costs necessary to till a scarce 
and fertile land. Even though being used to indicate inefficiency, Ricardian rent is seen as being "above-normal earnings" that remain even if the 
 




                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
economy is in equilibrium SAUTET, F. 2013. Local and systemic entrepreneurship: solving the puzzle of entrepreneurship and economic development. 
Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice, 387.. 
         
